I recently debated former Christian minister John Loftus on The Debate Hour (click here to download the program). One of the many inconsistencies I noticed in John’s (and Reginald’s) position was that he frequently applied some “test” to Christianity that would absolutely destroy atheism, if only he applied his test consistently.
For instance, John and Reginald asked me whether I would expect a world of suffering, given my belief in an all-powerful, wholly good Being. John repeated this challenge in his blog:
Your mission, should you choose it, is to try to sufficiently explain why there is so much intense suffering in this world, if a good, omnipotent God exists. Is this the world you would expect prior to experiencing it, if that kind of God existed?
Presumably, by “sufficiently explain,” John means “give an explanation that atheists will find persuasive.” I’m not sure that this is even possible, so John’s dice may be loaded. But I like to live dangerously.
If we begin with only the concept of God, and we try to deduce what kind of world, if any, this Being would create, would we expect anything like the world around us? Before I answer this question, let us first consider how atheists would answer it if they took the extraordinary step of applying their tests consistently (i.e. to both theism and atheism). Now the question becomes:
If God does not exist, is this the world we would expect prior to experiencing it?
The answer, of course, is “No.” We would never expect a world like ours (a world which had a beginning) without some first cause. Indeed, I wouldn’t expect any world at all without something to cause it. And this is why atheism is so unconvincing (unless we exempt atheism from the critical evaluations we apply to other positions). If God is involved, God can choose what kind of world to create. But if God is not involved, the atheist is left with sheer improbabilities, and improbabilities are some of atheism’s chief adversaries. Suppose that God does not exist. What are the odds that a universe will form out of nothing, by nothing? I would say that the odds are effectively zero. But let’s suppose that the “nothingness” somehow overcomes these odds and produces a universe. Would the universe that forms be suitable for life? The odds are overwhelmingly against this. The constants necessary for life have to be fine-tuned to an amazing degree (and that’s a tremendous understatement). But let’s suppose that “randomness” overcomes these odds and the universe ends up finely tuned for life. Would life form? Like it or not, the odds are against this as well, but let’s grant the atheists a single-celled organism. Would this single-celled organism evolve into multi-celled organisms? Probably not, but let’s grant it anyway. To speed things up a bit, would these multi-celled organisms eventually develop into conscious, autonomous agents, capable of reason, moral action, and intense suffering? The probabilities here are so astronomically against atheism that we must admit that, if God does not exist, we would never expect anything even remotely resembling our world.
A sophisticated atheist may regroup and say, “Ah, but the properties you ascribe to God lead us to expect a world different from ours, whereas atheism doesn’t lead us to expect any particular world.” But atheism does lead me to a particular expectation. It leads me to expect that there would be nothing at all. And, if something does form, I would expect a world that cannot support life.
It seems, then, that if we apply the “expectation” criterion to atheism, the atheist must forfeit his belief. After all, that was the point of the original challenge. If we wouldn’t expect our world on the theist’s hypothesis, then the theist should abandon his hypothesis. However, as we have seen, on the atheist’s hypothesis, we certainly would expect our world. The atheist’s belief can’t pass the atheist’s own test, which means that there’s a double-standard here.
But let’s return to John’s challenge. Given my belief in God, would I expect a world like ours? True, I might not expect a world like ours in every detail, but I would expect a world somewhat like ours. I said this on the program, and John and Reginald both seemed to think I was being insincere. I offered what I call a “Two-World Theodicy,” in which I argue that, proceeding philosophically, we can construct our world from scratch, beginning with the idea of an all-powerful, wholly good Being.
I shall present my Two-World Theodicy in a future post. For now, I will give a simpler response that will at least get us much farther than atheism will ever get us.
First, God could either create a world or not create a world. Since I think it’s better to be creative, I would expect God to create a world. (We’ve now got a world, so we’re already beyond what atheism can achieve.)
Second, God could either put living beings in this world, or leave it lifeless. I believe that life is better than non-life, so I would expect God to add some living beings. (Now we’re way beyond atheism.)
Third, God could either populate this world with free beings (morally free, volitionally free, etc.), or he could create only beings that lack true freedom. I think freedom is extremely important, so I would expect God to create free beings.
Fourth, these beings will either obey God or disobey God. Based on what I know of every free being I’ve ever met (and here I’m appealing mildly to experience), it wouldn’t surprise me to find that these free beings will disobey God.
Fifth, God could either remain with these disobedient beings, giving them a perfect world, or he could separate himself from them. Since I believe that God’s goodness implies holiness and justice, I would expect God to separate himself from these creatures (to some extent).
Sixth, if God separates himself from our world, would I expect a perfect world of complete pleasure, or a world with both pain and pleasure? To be honest, I would expect a world of both pain and pleasure. Indeed, I would be absolutely shocked if God gave a perfect world to a bunch of rebellious creatures.
Seventh, would I expect God to intervene whenever something goes wrong? No, I wouldn’t. Since the free beings had rejected a world in which God takes care of everything, I have no reason to think that God would overrule their rejection every time they get into trouble.
So, it seems that I might expect a world like ours after all. True, the issue is far more complex than I’ve made it here. But we’ve covered the major steps, and the most important point is that theism gets us much closer to our world than atheism can.
Now that I’ve offered at least some idea of why a theist might expect a world like ours, atheists will have many objections. But it seems only fair that before they object, they return the gesture. That is, John (or another atheist) should show that atheism can get us a world somewhat like our own. Once he has done that, we can focus on working out the difficulties in my position. Thus, I will modify John’s original challenge so that it applies to his own position:
Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to try to sufficiently explain why the world is as it is, if God does not exist. Is this the world you would expect prior to experiencing it, if atheism is true?
65 comments:
I think you need to further clarify yourth fifth point. God was with humans, humans sinned, and then God left? Is that how the Biblical account goes?
I've actually often thought about the problem of pain in the same way: if there were a world in which there was a God and no problem of pain, what would it look like? This, of course, would be a world in which the great majority of the atheists who are solely atheists because they reject an omnibenevolent God who would create a world with such an exorbitant amount of suffering would no longer be atheists on such a basis.
I suppose that many variables would be eliminated:
1) Humans would be the most powerful, protected, indestructible creature there is. Animals could not kill us, and falling off things would not be a problem. Somehow, less fragile humans would eliminate much pain.
2) All humans would enter the world in a state of cognizance and equality, so that none would be assaulted by another one of the humans in an unjust situation. Childhood would be excluded. If God is expected to distribute love equally, this would comport him creating equally defensible humans at every point.
3) Death would happen, certainly, but of course infant and child deaths would be completely eliminated, deaths by nature (animal attacks, physical force) would be significantly lessened, which leaves only two sources of death left: violence from humans and diseases. Removing the combustible properties from element could solve the problem of weapons, however more primitive it would make civilization. Cures for diseases would be naturally supplied by nature, so that the perversity of creation is apparent, but at the same time, remedied.
I am not sure how humans would enter life without infantile development, but then again my brain is very small.
That is what would be expected of a world deprived of atheists on the basis of the argument from evil. At least according to the way I have entertained the thought exercise while bored in class. I doubt that's what the teacher thought I was thinking about.
"Philip, focus! We're in class, remember? What are you even thinking about?!"
"Oh, sorry. Theodicy. My bad."
David, Francis Schaeffer did something along these lines in his book, He Is There And He Is Not Silent. You may want to check that out, but he wasn't dealing with the problem of evil. See also Thomas Morris' Francis Schaeffer's Apologetics: A Critique.
There are several things I can say in response, and here is the short version. 1) Why does something exist at all? You and I should both be extremely surprised that something, anything, exists. We should expect that nothing at all exists, since if something does exist, it demands an explanation. 2) "The beauty of Darwinian evolution is that it explains the very improbable, by gradual degrees. It starts from primeval simplicity (relatively easy to understand) and works up, by plausibly small steps, to complex entities whose genesis, by any non-gradual process, would be too improbable for serious contemplation. Design is a real alternative, but only if the designer is himself the product of an escalatory process such as evolution by natural selection, either on this planet or elsewhere. There may be alien life forms so advanced that we would worship them as gods. But they too must ultimately be explained by gradual escalation. Gods that exist ab initio are ruled out by the argument from improbability, even more surely than are spontaneously erupting eyes or elbow joints.” [Richard Dawkins]
3) Now that we do exist, this universe is exactly the way it should be for us to know that it exists. This is known as the anthropic principle, which I'm sure you are aware of. According to Richard Dawkins, the anthropic principle is the better alternative to the design hypothesis. “It has been estimated that there are between 1 billion and 30 billion planets in our galaxy, and about 100 billion galaxies in the universe,” so “a billion billion is a conservative estimate of the number of available planets in the universe.” Therefore “even with such absurdly long odds, life will still have arisen on a billion planets—of which Earth, of course, is one.” Once life has arisen the principle of natural selection takes over, and “natural selection is emphatically not a matter of luck.” [The God Delusion, pp. 134-141].
4) The law of predation in the nature world fits much better with the theory of evolution, since there is no good reason for it if God created this world. Animals didn't even need to be created.
David said: I think freedom is extremely important, so I would expect God to create free beings.
This seems to get at the heart of our debate when it comes to the free will defense. I am planning a lengthy piece on the nature and value of free will.
John,
(1) You're surprised that there is something rather than nothing, and rightly so. But as I've said repeatedly, I believe that it's good to create, so if God has the power, it's no surprise to me that he created a world. Saying "Why did God create a world?" is like saying "Why did John Loftus have children?" We have children because it's good to have children. No other reason is necessary.
(2) Darwinism, even in theory, only works when you have a certain type of living organism (i.e. one that reproduces copies of itself, copies that are slightly different, but not too different). Appealing to Darwinism does you no good at all unless you already have a universe, which must be finely-tuned for life, as well as a suitable planet. Where did you get all of that John? Darwinism didn't get it for you. And beyond this, you know that more and more scientists are coming to doubt the sufficiency of Darwinism. I was a biology major at a secular school, and the head of the graduate program and the chair of the department were both skeptical of the ability of natural selection to produce the variety of life around us. You can believe, by faith, that it all happened by natural means, but you can't say that it's unreasonable to conclude that at least some things were designed, when they obviously function as if they were designed.
(3) THE ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE???!!! That's your answer??? This isn't an explanation, John. I'm arguing, "This universe is extremely improbable on atheism," and your response is, "Well, the world has to be the way it is, or else we wouldn't be here to notice it." Again, that's not an explanation. Let me put the matter differently. Suppose you and I are kidnapped. Someone ties us to a chair and says, "I'm going to roll these dice a million times. Every time double sixes come up, I'll let you live. But as soon as any other numbers come up, I'm going to kill both of you." So he rolls the dice. "Double sixes!" You and I are amazed at our luck. He rolls again. "Double sixes!" We're absolutely stunned. But he rolls the dice a million times, and double sixes come up every time. At the end of this series, we'll be wondering why we're alive. Apparently, you would say, "Well, all the rolls had to come up double sixes, or else we wouldn't be here to notice." My reaction would be, "John, the dice were loaded."
(4) You say that the law of predation fits much better with evolution. I would argue that it doesn't fit at all with atheism, since atheism could never get us a world or animals to begin with. Notice also that you're being inconsistent again. You're saying, "My view accounts for X better than your view does." Even if I grant this, I would say that my view accounts for A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H better than atheism does (where A is the existence of the universe, B is fine-tuning, C is the moral law, etc.). In other words, you're dismissing theism because you think it doesn't explain some feature of our world. Well, I don't think atheism explains ANY feature of our world. So, on your own criteria, we would have to dismiss atheism.
As for freedom, you are correct. We disagree. And notice that our disagreements keep returning to value judgments. You don't think freedom is important, and I do. You don't think it's good to create, and I do. You think pain/pleasure are our top priority, and I don't. You think rebellion against God is a small matter, and I think it's huge. But this only shows that the argument from evil only works if people have a certain set of values. If someone has different values, the argument doesn't work.
BTW, John, you admitted that, given your worldview, you wouldn't expect our world. So you've failed your own test.
Also notice that I would expect at least some world (and, indeed, a world something like ours) on my worldview. You reject the idea that I could expect a world like ours, but you do so by presupposing your own value system. In other words, it's as if you're saying, "David, if you had my value system instead of your own, would you expect a world like ours, if God exists." True, I wouldn't. But your original question was whether I would expect a world like ours, given theism. And, like it or not, my values do lead me to expect a world like the one we see around us.
If God does not exist, is this the world we would expect prior to experiencing it?
The answer, of course, is “No.” We would never expect a world like ours (a world which had a beginning) without some first cause.
I am an atheist and yet I see no reason to have any particular expectation as to the origin of the universe. One could think of all manner of purely naturalistic possibilities. And as to the idea that it would be more plausible to expect nothing to exist rather than something: why? There seems no obvious reason for this assumption.
Suppose that God does not exist. What are the odds that a universe will form out of nothing, by nothing? I would say that the odds are effectively zero.
Do you actually think that's the only naturalistic option? At least acquaint yourself with the ideas of astronomers who specialize in cosmology if you're going to argue on this topic.
But atheism does lead me to a particular expectation. It leads me to expect that there would be nothing at all.
Again, why? This seems a purely baseless assumption.
Its also, I think, important to point out that you are somewhat comparing apples and oranges here. If we are going to compare what would be reasonably expected if atheism were true as compared to theism we should be comparing their predictions on the SAME topic.
So I have to wonder why you didn't address what we would expect in regard to suffering if atheism is true when that was the topic addressed by the problem of evil in regard to whether theism is true.
Of course, the obvious answer is because we would expect exactly the sort of world we actually inhabit in regard to suffering if atheism is true.....and doesn't serve the religious apologists aims. So instead another topic is brought up: cosmology. A topic on which we really have little reason to make any prediction in regard to either atheism or theism since the reasonable possibilities are vast for both.
Mr. Ellis,
Keep in mind the current dominant theory in cosmology--the Big Bang. There was a beginning to the universe. If you have nothing to cause this beginning (and I'm open to any suggestions you might have), then you have to simply say that the universe came from nothing, by nothing. Offer a better theory if you know of one.
As for switching the topic to cosmology, you missed the point. I was pointing out an inconsistency in the atheist's position. Atheists point to something and say, "Would you expect THAT if your God exists?" Yet they never apply this test to their own view, which doesn't account for anything. I could point to a rock and say, "Would you expect that if atheism is true?" And the answer would be "No."
Besides, the goal is to have a theory that accounts for as much data as possible. Theism accounts for a lot. Atheism accounts for nothing (literally). So atheists can point to things all day and say that we wouldn't expect them on theism, but if they applied this standard consistently, they would have to dismiss atheism long before they dismiss theism.
In short, atheism is a horribly deficient position, so it doesn't make sense for atheists to try to point out deficiencies in positions that are inherently much, much stronger.
Keep in mind the current dominant theory in cosmology--the Big Bang. There was a beginning to the universe. If you have nothing to cause this beginning (and I'm open to any suggestions you might have), then you have to simply say that the universe came from nothing, by nothing. Offer a better theory if you know of one.
Again, I would suggest more reading in cosmology. There is nothing in current astronomical knowledge to suggest that the Big Bang was the beginning of all physical reality or that what emerged from it is the totality of physical existence. That is simply unknown currently---though there are many hypotheses among cosmologists today concerning what existed prior to the Big Bang and what caused it. We simply have no means, yet, to test any of them.
As for switching the topic to cosmology, you missed the point.
I think I understand all too well why you chose to switch the topic to one about which practically nothing is definitively known.
Atheists point to something and say, "Would you expect THAT if your God exists?" Yet they never apply this test to their own view, which doesn't account for anything. I could point to a rock and say, "Would you expect that if atheism is true?" And the answer would be "No."
Again, this is an entirely unwarranted assumption. Why would I expect rocks (or anything else) to not exist if atheism is true? You have given no reasonable basis for this assumption.
So there are many theories. Yes, I know this, and I also know that they are all full of difficulties, and a bunch of bad theories don't add up to a good one. If you've studied this at all, you know that the dominant view is that all physical reality began with the Big Bang, along with time and space. But as an atheist, you have nothing to cause this beginning. You have no explanation at all. To prove me wrong, all you have to do is give me some explanation. Give me your best one. (I'll consider it carefully.)
When exactly did I shift the topic to cosmology? As far as I can tell, you're the one focusing on cosmology. In my response to Loftus's question, I brought up a number of issues, and cosmology was only one of them. Since atheists get so touchy when I mention the universe, I can only assume that this is a weak spot. And you haven't said anything to show me otherwise.
Also keep in mind, I did address suffering in my response. You're acting as if I just changed the subject, and you know this isn't true. I simply started from the beginning, since my goal was to explain why I would expect our present world to be the way it is. It simply doesn't make sense to me to say, "Why is the world like this? Tell me! But don't talk about the world or anything else except suffering." Is that what you're demanding?
P.S.
If you'd like to continue talking about cosmology (while complaining that we're talking about cosmology), here are a couple of quotations:
“Space and time were created in that event and so was all the matter in the universe. It is not meaningful to ask what happened before the Big Bang; it is like asking what is north of the North Pole. Similarly it is not sensible to ask where the Big Bang took place. The point-universe was not an object isolated in space; it was the entire universe, and so the only answer can be that the Big Bang happened everywhere.” (J. R. Gott, J. E. Gunn, D. N. Schramm, B. M. Tinsley, “Will the Universe Expand Forever?” in Scientific American [March, 1976], p. 65.)
“The most startling feature of the scientific theory is the suggestion that space itself was created in the big bang, and not merely matter. . . . The first instant of the big bang, where space was infinitely shrunken, represents a boundary or edge in time at which space ceases to exist. . . . Space is inextricably linked to time, and as space stretches and shrinks, so does time. Just as the big bang represents the creation of space, so it represents the creation of time. Neither space nor time can be extended back through the initial singularity. Crudely speaking, time itself began at the big bang.” (Paul Davies, God and the New Physics [New York: Touchstone, 1983], p. 18.)
When you say there are other theories, I assume you're thinking of multiverse theory. Here's a link to my critique of Smolin's theory:
Smolin’s Multiverse Theory
First, I would say that God is not an explanation of anything. God is what people say when they give up on an explanation. For to transfer "an uncaused event" from the universe to God is by no means ontologically simpler. You go from the universe only, which all of us agree does exist, to the universe + a Being whose attributes are incomprehensible...
The Anthropic Principle relies upon three ignorances:
i) how many universes there are
ii) how many cycles our universe has gone through
iii) how many configurations of the forces of our own universe would still result in life.
1) We don't know if our universe is the only one or not. We simply don't know, either way. There is no evidence for or against it. IF a great number, or infinite number, of other universes exist, with different fundamental forces (and thus no life), ours is not "special" -- no "money has changed hands".
2) We don't know what precedes the first ability of physics to peer into the past for our own universe. The singularity may be the result of prior contractions and expansions, whether or not this particular universe will ever have a "big crunch". The cyclic universe is actually reviving amongst academic cosmologists, esp Paul Steinhardt and Neil Turok, who have a nice FAQ on the subject. This doesn't invoke other universes, simply other possible configurations of our own, and so it is ontologically simpler. That is, if our universe has cycled through an enormous number of configurations, it is only reasonable to expect one of those to be like ours.
3) Given all other constants are set as they are, altering one of them is catastrophic for the potential of life. However, physicists will readily admit that changing these constants in ratios is completely beyond our ability to predict the consequences of. That is, if we tweak G by a certain amount, and we tweak the property of the strong nuclear force as well in some way, and of EM, and of the weak nuclear force...no one knows what ratios would still give a universe with the properties necessary for life. No one knows.
In that sense, the "money changing hands" argument, that "the universe is just too special to be here as it is all on its own" is largely predicated upon that which we do not know -- a big fat argument from ignorance.
The Big Bang is the result of extrapolating back the equations of GR and quantum physics to the point that they break down. That is why it is called a "singularity". Typically, most physicists will admit that this singularity results from the irreconcilable differences between general relativity and quantum theory. We need a quantum gravity.
Everyone in the physics community accepts that in the past, our universe was very small and very hot. However, when the universe contracts to a certain size, and when we approach the Planck length, all of physics break down. It is literally a huge gaping hole in our knowledge. And you want to use this ignorance as a launching point to insert God, just like people always have -- a god of the gaps.
The Standard Model (Big Bang) has had to be "tweaked" many times, to put it mildly. Most significantly, the inflantionary epoch was added in after it was determined that space was not curved, but flat, in contrast to the model's prediction, and that matter is not unevenly distrubted, but evenly distributed. Also, "dark energy" seems to many like a placeholder for a more significant revision of the model.
That is why the search for a "Theory of Everything" or "Grand Unified Theory" occupied most of Einstein's latter years, and most of the effort of the theoretical physics community today.
It is entirely expected that the singularity will be resolved. And this resolution, then, will do away with the utter weirdness of a "beginning of time". Since time-space-matter-energy are all related, to say that this big package "poofs" out of nothing is ridiculous. To say that it has always been, although it has gone through various changes, is much more logical.
Paul Steinhardt and Neil Turok may have already done so -- they do not advocate a multiverse, but instead, show that our own universe may oscillate between a "big bang" and a "big crunch" -- I find this explanation simple and beautiful (see my two comments there):
A Cyclic Model of the Universe (Science), SciAm, Space.com, FAQ by Steinhardt
If you've studied this at all, you know that the dominant view is that all physical reality began with the Big Bang, along with time and space.
In fact, most astronomers would admit that the above is simply an assumption unwarranted by the evidence. All OBSERVABLE space and time emerged from the big bang (its pretty hard to see beyond a singularity). Look at the dates on your quotes, 1976 and 1983, and even in those days those conclusions were not based on any actual evidence.
The simple fact is: we don't know what came before or caused the Big Bang (yet!).
At this point the matter is entirely speculative.
But back to the issue of suffering. We would expect a loving person to not stand by and allow horrendous and needless suffering when they are able to come to a persons aid. We, obviously would not expect a universe ruled by mindless physical forces to care about or even by aware of suffering.
Obviously, a world with terrible suffering is more consistent with naturalism than with the usual variety of theism.
It is also consistent with a universe with 2 equally or near equally powerful deities, one good and one evil. Its consistent with a wide variety of supernatural belief systems....but for a belief system that claims that is an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being.....yeah, that's a major problem. Nothing you have yet said does anything to alleviate that problem.
to point out more specifically the flawed nature of your attempt to reconcile the christian God with the suffering observed in this world:
Seventh, would I expect God to intervene whenever something goes wrong? No, I wouldn’t. Since the free beings had rejected a world in which God takes care of everything, I have no reason to think that God would overrule their rejection every time they get into trouble.
Infants who die slowly of birth defects did not disobey or reject any God and yet, if he exists, he stands by and lets they die in slow agony.
We're walking well tromped ground here. The theodicy you present is nothing new. Its flaws have been pointed out a thousand times before.
David, my answer was that I should expect nothing to exist (nothing), as in no God, no world, no universe at all. Why is there something, anything, rather than nothing at all?
Now it's true you can believe in God based on Bayesian background factors like the design argument. And it's true you and I can debate the design argument. But I'm already granting you, for the sake of argument, that your God exists. I'm granting, hypothetically anyway, that an omni-God exists, okay? My challenge to you is to attempt to explain why this God, if he exists, created this particular world (not a different one).
So, you can continue arguing that there is a designer God if you want to do so. But that's not what you'd have to defend in any dissertation on the problem of evil that I would oversee, if it were me.
Besides, your claim is that the design argument trumps (or defeats) the problem of evil. Does it? How? The problem of evil is also a problem for the intelligence of the designer. Since I'm arguing against the existence of your faith in the Omni-God, then this universe was designed by either an incompetent, uncaring, or mentally challenged Deity.
I might even grant for the sake of argument that you see a designer God behind this universe. If so, what kind of designer is he? Is he truly the Omni-God you wish to defend? If this universe is designed, then you need to explain not just the eye, but also the creation of the Brown Recluse Spider, the Yew plant, parasites, hurricanes, and tsunami's, not to mention why this God gave us free will (later). If it's designed, then explain these things. Are they designed too? For what purpose? What is the greater good?
Hi David,
I see you're using the freewill defense. That's a standard theodicy. No surprise there.
As a Calvinist, I'm not a big fan of the FWD.
However, that's beside the point since you're debating Loftus rather than me.
With that in mind, I'd like to make a few points if I might:
1. A cornerstone of Loftus' atheology is his assumption that Christians are, in principle, able to override their (religious) social conditioning.
That's one reason he writes and blogs and debates in favor of atheism.
Although he doesn't think he can dissuade every Christian, he believes it's possible to convince some Christians that Christianity is false.
The question this poses for him is whether it commits him to some version of (libertarian?) freewill.
Are we ever free to override our social conditioning, including our religious conditioning?
If not, then who is his audience? What is he trying to accomplish?
If need be, this could also be expanded to the question of biological or genetic determinism. From his viewpoint, we are strictly biochemical organisms.
So, if you combine physical determinism with social conditioning, it's hard to see where there's room to break our religious programming, for those of us who have been conditioned (on his view) to be Christian.
2. BTW, it's not clear to me whether he's attempting to mount an internal or external argument from evil in his debate with you.
That needs to be clarified, for it affects the burden of proof. If he is covertly operating with an external argument from evil, then the onus is on him to establish some version of secular ethics which will underwrite his paradigm-cases of evil.
3. On a related note, he would also need to establish some version of secular anthropology which makes room for pain and suffering, pace eliminative materialism.
I don't think he has any good answers to these questions, which is why he invariably dodges that challenge.
4. Yet another problem is that, even if he's mounting a consistently internal critique, unless he's a moral realist, who cares where the truth lies?
In other words, it's only (morally) wrong to be (factually) wrong if there's such a thing as right and wrong.
If you deny the distinction between right and wrong, then the distinction between truth and falsehood is trivialized.
For even if I'm mistaken, why should I care unless I'm under some moral obligation to hold true beliefs?
While it's logically possible to be both an ethical antirealist and an alethic realist, ethical antirealism detroys the logical incentive to be a truth-seeker.
First, science.
You've illustrated quite well the most common atheist tactic in responding to the problem of origins. Talk about a bunch of scientific theories, whether or not they address the problem, and hope that your reader will assume that you answered the problem.
So let me get this straight. God is not an explanation. But an infinite series of unseen, undetectable universes IS an explanation? Based on everything we know, time and space originated in the Big Bang, yet it's an "explanation" for you to say, "Well, maybe there were tons of other universes out there."
You note that the cyclic universe is reviving among cosmologists. Do you know why? It's because they're recognizing the absurdity (as I think you do) of a universe beginning from nothing, by nothing. This forces them to think of some way that things could be eternal, whether the evidence supports their view or not.
An oscillating universe??!! This doesn't help you. Our current universe is expanding, and it will never contract. What does this mean? Well, it won't oscillate any more. Now follow this through to its logical conclusion. You need something infinite, which means that you must agree that we have already passed an infinite number of past universes. But we know, based on our current universe, that one of the possible configurations of universes is one which will never contract (an "open universe"). But surely in the infinite past configurations of universes, one of the configurations would have been an open universe, which would have stopped the process. Since this isn't the case, there couldn't have been an infinite number of past universes. This means that you need a finite number of past universes, and you still arrive at a universe with a beginning. It is therefore pointless to appeal to other universes to get you away from the problem of origins.
Notice that I asked you for your best theory, and your best theory is completely flawed. Notice also that you're being incredibly inconsistent. You're saying, "Well, we just don't know enough about things to say what is the case. Our knowledge is limited." Yet you turn to the theist and say, "Explain all this evil! Completely!" Why can't a theist respond, "Well, we just don't know enough about things to say what is the case" (as you respond when you can't answer a question)?
What I'm seeing is this. If you don't have a complete explanation, it's okay to appeal to ignorance. If theists don't have a complete explanation, it's because theism is false. Beyond this, I'd say that theists do have explanations for suffering, so we're already in a better boat than atheists.
As for Christians making an argument from ignorance, this is simply false. Based on everything we can gather from science, whatever begins to exist must have a cause. The universe began to exist. Therefore, the universe must have a cause. Now we simply need to find a cause that adequately accounts for the universe. Does the oscillating universe do this? No. Does multiverse theory do it? No. Does God do it? Yes. Thus, out of all the candidates before us, God is the only causally adequate explanation.
And, I should add, God explains far more. At best, if atheists some day come up with an explanation of how the universe could be eternal, this will only account for the existence of our universe. It wouldn't account for anything else (fine-tuning, life, consciousness, the moral law, miracles, etc.).
Now is the fine-tuning argument an argument from ignorance? Your response is that the proper ratio of constants could allow for other possibilities. But still, even if there were a large number of "perfect ratios" (which, you admit, is pure speculation), a universe without these perfect ratios would be far more probable than a universe with constants set perfectly for life.
Theists look at this and they realize that this sort of fine-tuning is what we expect from design, not from chance. And when we add in all the other evidence for design, and a number of other factors, we just find it intolerable to say, "Well, we don't know. Maybe there's an explanation that accounts for all of this, even though we just can't think of one."
You can say you don't like theism, but to suggest that your constant appeals to ignorance are somehow superior to the theist's appeal to something that would actually account for our observations only reveals your bias.
The question this poses for him is whether it commits him to some version of (libertarian?) freewill.
The answer is: no.
Free will does not have to exist for one to be able to come to disagree with opinions they were brought up in. That should be obvious. Only an absurdly naive view of human psychology could claim otherwise.
Of course, one is also not committed by being an atheist to the position that free will cannot exist. Naturalism does not necessitate the absence of free will.
Personally, I see only one way to put the issue of free will/determinism to the test:
if we could create a complete and perfect computer model of the functioning of a person's brain and, using it, accurately predict their behavior with complete (or at least near total) accuracy, then I would think that weigh so heavily against free will as to make it disconfirmed beyond reasonable doubt.
Of course, we don't currently have the technological means to perform such an experiment. And since I have heard no other way to test either hypothesis the only sensible position, I think, is to admit one does not know whether free will exists or not.
That needs to be clarified, for it affects the burden of proof. If he is covertly operating with an external argument from evil, then the onus is on him to establish some version of secular ethics which will underwrite his paradigm-cases of evil.
A secular ethic is no problem. But it isn't necessary to the argument from evil (so I won't go into my own meta-ethical views here). The argument from evil depends on the contradiction between calling a person loving and saying they would not help someone in dire need.
It does not require any moral judgement as to whether they SHOULD help someone in need.
On a related note, he would also need to establish some version of secular anthropology which makes room for pain and suffering, pace eliminative materialism.
Please clarify. I'm not sure what you are saying here.
In other words, it's only (morally) wrong to be (factually) wrong if there's such a thing as right and wrong.
If you deny the distinction between right and wrong, then the distinction between truth and falsehood is trivialized.
For even if I'm mistaken, why should I care unless I'm under some moral obligation to hold true beliefs?
To be moral, fundamentally, is simply to be concerned for the well-being of others. To love.
Love needs no external sanction. Divine or otherwise. It is of value in and of itself and, therefore, the basis of morality poses no difficultly for either I, an atheist, nor you, a theist.
If you are going to argue that the nontheist has no basis for morality then you cannot, as I do, consider love of intrinsic value---for you it can only draw its worth from an external source.
Surely that is not a position you are comfortable taking.
You've illustrated quite well the most common atheist tactic in responding to the problem of origins. Talk about a bunch of scientific theories, whether or not they address the problem, and hope that your reader will assume that you answered the problem.
The simple fact is, there are many possible answers to the question:
What caused the big bang?
And we currently simply don't know which hypothesis is correct. Or even whether anyone has yet thought up the hypothesis which will turn out to be correct.
Give us a testable version of the Divine Creation model of the cause of the big bang which makes confirmable mathematically precise predictions and we will take it as a scientifically confirmed theory.
That is what a naturalistic model of the cause of the Big Bang must do to be taken as correct. Should the theistic hypothesis be held to a lesser standard?
First, I want to point out some specifics about myself so you know that context of the following words. I am a Christian that works in molecular biology and I dabble in philosophy. The main reason I wrote this is b/c iron sharpens iron.
First, God could either create a world or not create a world. Since I think it’s better to be creative, I would expect God to create a world. (We’ve now got a world, so we’re already beyond what atheism can achieve.)
I think this one’s kind of up in the air, but if God creates simply b/c creating is good, then why would He stop? Wouldn’t God be constantly creating? Why rest on the 7th day?
Second, God could either put living beings in this world, or leave it lifeless. I believe that life is better than non-life, so I would expect God to add some living beings. (Now we’re way beyond atheism.)
This all seems kind of circular to me. He is expected to create life b/c life is good? Why is life good? I’m God, being God is perfectly fine on His own.
Third, God could either populate this world with free beings (morally free, volitionally free, etc.), or he could create only beings that lack true freedom. I think freedom is extremely important, so I would expect God to create free beings.
Again, why is freedom important? B/c God gave it to us? B/c if we weren’t free, then we would be God’s puppets? He’s God He can do what He wants, why give us freedom?
Fourth, these beings will either obey God or disobey God. Based on what I know of every free being I’ve ever met (and here I’m appealing mildly to experience), it wouldn’t surprise me to find that these free beings will disobey God.
Why does it make so much sense that they would disobey?
Other than the fact that we already know that we disobey. If a God creates these beings and it’s given that He creates them free, what reason do we have to expect the created beings to abuse that freedom by disobeying?
Fifth, God could either remain with these disobedient beings, giving them a perfect world, or he could separate himself from them. Since I believe that God’s goodness implies holiness and justice, I would expect God to separate himself from these creatures (to some extent).
To what extent?
Would He completely separate Himself from them? Why does this make sense? In referring to holiness and justice it would seem that God would indeed remove Himself completely or He could destroy us and start over from scratch and create new beings.
Sixth, if God separates himself from our world, would I expect a perfect world of complete pleasure, or a world with both pain and pleasure? To be honest, I would expect a world of both pain and pleasure. Indeed, I would be absolutely shocked if God gave a perfect world to a bunch of rebellious creatures.
If God separated Himself wholly I would expect a world of darkness and disorder and pain. If God removed Himself only in part then yes, I’d expect a balance between pain and pleasure.
Seventh, would I expect God to intervene whenever something goes wrong? No, I wouldn’t. Since the free beings had rejected a world in which God takes care of everything, I have no reason to think that God would overrule their rejection every time they get into trouble.
I wouldn’t expect God to intervene at all if He is holy and just. As stated before He could just leave us to our own devices. Where does justice end and compassion begin? When does He leave us to suffer and when does He heal us? God is the only one that can make these distinctions.
On a related note, he would also need to establish some version of secular anthropology which makes room for pain and suffering, pace eliminative materialism.
So far as I can recall, John never claimed to be an eliminative materialist, nor is that position the only or the the dominant position, among athiests. So why would he need to explain suffering in terms of it?
Alethes,
Keep in mind, the question was whether "I" would expect suffering. And I've said that a lot of my reason for answering "yes" comes from certain values I have.
Yes, I believe it's good to create--a universe, life, etc. You seem to agree with John that since God doesn't need anything, God has no reason to create. So would you say that, since I don't need a child, I have no reason to have one? Is it really so odd to think that there's something good about bringing life into the world, or making a world for life?
As for freedom, without it there would be no genuine love, and no one freely choosing to serve God. I would say that we all understand the significance of free will. Watch the Stepford Wives. Does anyone think that a perfect robot wife is better than a flawed real wife (i.e. one who isn't programmed to love you)?
As for rebellion, I said that I'm basing this to some extent on my knowledge of people. Every person I've ever known or heard of (with one exception) rebelled against God in some way, even those who were wholeheartedly dedicated to God. It seems, then, that we have a tendency to rebel.
God didn't completely separate from us (since we still exist, and God sustains us in being). The point is that he separated himself from us to some extent. He isn't walking in the garden anymore. I'm glad you agree that a partial separation (which, I think, is the biblical view) would result in a world of both pain and pleasure.
Mr. Ellis,
You said that there are many possible answers to the question "What caused the Big Bang?" Well, I'm only asking for one--one that isn't filled with problems. You offered the oscillating universe model, and it just doesn't work. In fact, none of the models work. Again, a bunch of bad theories don't add up to a good one. And until you have some theory that works, theists are in a better spot than you. (Indeed, even if you come up with a theory that works in this one area, you'll never have a theory with the explanatory power of theism. There are simply too many holes in atheism.)
david b. ellis said...
"Free will does not have to exist for one to be able to come to disagree with opinions they were brought up in. That should be obvious. Only an absurdly naive view of human psychology could claim otherwise."
You seem to be parachuting into this discussion without knowing much about Loftus' position. In his "Outsider Test," which he trots out ad nauseum, Loftus argues that religious beliefs are socially conditioned.
Therefore, the question of whether we are ever free to override our socially-conditioned beliefs (be they religious or irreligious) is directly relevant to his own position.
I'd add that his position on social conditioning logically commits him to cultural relativism, which—in turn—logically commits him to moral relativism. In that event he could never mount an external argument from evil, but, at best, an internal argument from evil.
"A secular ethic is no problem."
Surely you jest. There are many obstacles to secular ethics. Indeed, a number of secular philosophers subscribe to some version of moral relativism as a logical entailment of their secular outlook. For examples of both, see:
http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=6383
http://www.qsmithwmu.com/moral_realism_and_infinte_spacetime_imply_moral_nihilism_by_quentin_smith.htm
http://www.believermag.com/issues/200307/?read=interview_ruse
http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/evol-eth.htm
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/
http://www.bringyou.to/apologetics/p20.htm
"But it isn't necessary to the argument from evil (so I won't go into my own meta-ethical views here). The argument from evil depends on the contradiction between calling a person loving and saying they would not help someone in dire need."
This is a straw man argument. What position are you opposing? Judeo-Christian theism? If so, such a simplistic formulation of the "contradiction" will hardly do. There's more at issue than a loving God and a person in need.
There is also the issue of how a *just* God should treat a *sinner*.
There are times when it would be immoral to help a person in dire need. If Joseph Stalin is in dire need of a heart transplant, and I'm a heart surgeon, should I supply his need? Hardly. He's a mass murderer. The longer his lives, the more innocent victims he murders.
"Please clarify. I'm not sure what you are saying here."
Eliminative materialism relegates pain and suffering to folk psychology. Eliminativism denies such mental states as pain and suffering.
"To be moral, fundamentally, is simply to be concerned for the well-being of others. To love."
That's all assertion and no argument.
"Love needs no external sanction. Divine or otherwise. It is of value in and of itself and, therefore, the basis of morality poses no difficultly for either I, an atheist, nor you, a theist."
That's another assertion absent an argument. You are *reducing* morality to love, and then *stipulating* that love is an intrinsic value.
How does a secular worldview underwrite your value system? How do you avoid the naturalistic fallacy or the is-ought fallacy?
"If you are going to argue that the nontheist has no basis for morality then you cannot, as I do, consider love of intrinsic value---for you it can only draw its worth from an external source. Surely that is not a position you are comfortable taking."
1. To begin with, I don't reduce the sum total of morality to love.
2. An external source can be quite germane to grounding morality. In Christian ethics, God endowed human beings with a certain nature. We are a specific *kind* of creature. Hence, what is licit or illicit conduct is in some measure indexed to our natural constitution. To the way in which we were designed to function.
"So far as I can recall, John never claimed to be an eliminative materialist, nor is that position the only or the the dominant position, among athiests. So why would he need to explain suffering in terms of it?"
If his argument from evil is, in part, an external argument, then he needs to establish that biochemical organisms like men and other animals are capable of pain and suffering. For if they are incapable of suffering, then they are incapable of *gratuitous* suffering—and the argument from evil turns on the alleged existence of gratuitous suffering.
Eliminativism is arguably the most consistent form of naturalized epistemology. A secularist is committed to a program of naturalized epistemology.
Yes, there are well-known critics of eliminativism like Nagel and Searle. And eliminativism is easy to critique on its own grounds.
But it's not so easy to critique of you share the operating assumptions of the eliminative materialist. The Churchlands argue that if you're a committed physicalist, then that, in turn, commits you to eliminative materialism.
Nagel and Searle don't attack it on that basis. They attack it on its own grounds.
But that doesn't relieve the dilemma. The relation between physicalism and eliminativism. They don't explain how physicalism fails to implicate eliminativism.
Well, I'm only asking for one--one that isn't filled with problems. You offered the oscillating universe model, and it just doesn't work.
You are confusing me with another poster. I never mentioned the oscillating universe model.
Personally I find other hypotheses more promising---but currently we simply have no real clue what hypothesis is correct or even whether the correct hypothesis has yet been proposed.
Again, a bunch of bad theories don't add up to a good one. And until you have some theory that works, theists are in a better spot than you.
Divine creation is as much a scientific hypothesis as any other.....and equally without any evidence in its favor.
The fact that something is currently unknown doesn't make "God did it" the default explanation. That's God of the Gaps reasoning at it "finest".
never have a theory with the explanatory power of theism. There are simply too many holes in atheism.
Such as?
You seem to be parachuting into this discussion without knowing much about Loftus' position. In his "Outsider Test," which he trots out ad nauseum, Loftus argues that religious beliefs are socially conditioned.
Therefore, the question of whether we are ever free to override our socially-conditioned beliefs (be they religious or irreligious) is directly relevant to his own position.
I am well aware of the "outsider test". I've been a regular visitor to Loftus' blog for some time.
And I still contend that its quite obvious that, even if free will does not exist, that social conditioning is not necessarily absolute or inescapable. If you think otherwise please present an actual argument or evidence for this claim.
One example: our social conditioning can include religious indoctrination. But it can also include the introduction to scientific reasoning, critical thinking and skepticism. The conflict between these two sets of cultural influences are often what leads a person to deconvert from their religion. The working out of this conflict in favor of abandoning religious beliefs is just as compatible with determinism as with free will.
This is a straw man argument. What position are you opposing? Judeo-Christian theism? If so, such a simplistic formulation of the "contradiction" will hardly do. There's more at issue than a loving God and a person in need.
There is also the issue of how a *just* God should treat a *sinner*.
ReallY? Like an newborn slowly and agonizingly dying of a congenital defect?
What is a just God's response to this newborn "sinner".
"To be moral, fundamentally, is simply to be concerned for the well-being of others. To love."
That's all assertion and no argument.
Its my understanding of how the concept of being moral is generally used (as in the Golden Rule).
Eliminativism is arguably the most consistent form of naturalized epistemology.
According to you.....not according to any atheist posting in these comments.
But it's not so easy to critique of you share the operating assumptions of the eliminative materialist. The Churchlands argue that if you're a committed physicalist, then that, in turn, commits you to eliminative materialism.
I, for one, take no position on the ultimate substance(s) of which reality is composed. Dualism. Monism. Materialism. Idealism. All these metaphysical concepts are speculative and, so far as I can tell, neither confirmable nor falsifiable.
And, therefore, of no concern to me.
We've certainly gotten far removed from the problem of evil.
We must examine explanations in terms of causal adequacy, explanatory scope, etc. Atheist explanations are causally inadequate (i.e. even if the cause was there, it wouldn't produce the effect). And each explanation is very limited in scope. The theistic explanation, by contrast, is certainly adequate to produce the effects in question, and theism is quite broad in explanatory scope (i.e. it accounts for many things, not one thing).
As for the God of the gaps, theism (as I'm using it in this exchange) is an inference to the best explanation. Given a fine-tuned world, or amazing biological complexity, or evidence for a miracle, we seek an explanation. And if only God accounts for our observations, we're not appealing to a God of the Gaps. We're appealing to the best explanation.
Moreover, this is another inconsistency of the atheist camp. Atheists point to evil and claim that they've found a gap in what can be explained by the theist. And, as you know, they fill this gap with atheism. For Victor Reppert's take on this:
Atheism of the Gaps
david b. ellis said...
"And I still contend that its quite obvious that, even if free will does not exist, that social conditioning is not necessarily absolute or inescapable. If you think otherwise please present an actual argument or evidence for this claim."
You're missing the point. This isn't *my* argument. This is Loftus' argument. I am merely pointing out a tension between his appeal to social conditioning in the Outsider Test, and his attempt to persuade readers of the moral and intellectual superiority of atheism.
He using social conditioning to discredit Christian faith, but he acts as if the secular humanist is exempt from social conditioning.
"The working out of this conflict in favor of abandoning religious beliefs is just as compatible with determinism as with free will."
Remember that my objections weren't originally directed at your position, whatever that is, but against Loftus' position.
Are you presuming to speak for him, or to speak for yourself?
"ReallY? Like an newborn slowly and agonizingly dying of a congenital defect? What is a just God's response to this newborn 'sinner'."
Once again, what position do you think you're opposing? Christian theology? According to Christian theology, why do some people die in infancy? Due to original sin.
If you don't like that rationale, you can attack it, but you can only do so by shifting from an internal critique, based on the allegation of inner tensions in Christian theology, to an external critique, in which you criticize original sin according to some principle of secular ethics.
"Its my understanding of how the concept of being moral is generally used (as in the Golden Rule)."
You're isolating the Golden Rule from the totality of Biblical ethics. The God of the Bible is the judge of mankind. He's a God who punishes sinners with historical as well as eternal penalties. He is a divine warrior as well as a redeemer.
If you're going to mount an internal critique of Christian theism, then you don't get to be arbitrarily selective and lopsided about the revealed character of God.
Thus far you're attacking a caricature of Christian theism. So your objections miss the target.
"According to you.....not according to any atheist posting in these comments."
The fact that the atheist commenters on this blog haven't throughout through their position is irrelevant to the inner logic of physicalism.
"We've certainly gotten far removed from the problem of evil."
No, eliminative materialism is not far removed from the problem of evil. Nothing could be more salient to the issue at hand.
An atheist can either try to mount an internal argument from evil or else an external argument from evil.
To do the latter, he must, among other things, show that, despite physicalism, biochemical organisms are capable of pain and suffering.
If he can't do that, then he's left with an internal critique.
I'd add that over at my blog, Loftus has commented favorably on Francis Crick and Daniel Dennett. That would point him in the direction of eliminative materialism.
As for the God of the gaps, theism (as I'm using it in this exchange) is an inference to the best explanation. Given a fine-tuned world, or amazing biological complexity, or evidence for a miracle, we seek an explanation. And if only God accounts for our observations, we're not appealing to a God of the Gaps. We're appealing to the best explanation.
Yes, IF God were the only plausible explanation that would be the case. However, there is very little credible evidence of any miraculous event. There is no reason to think biological complexity of the sort we see cannot arise by natural evolution and fine-tuning can be account for equally well by several naturalistic hypotheses as by the theistic hypothesis.
But none of this is actually relevent to the topic of the problem of evil.
Moreover, this is another inconsistency of the atheist camp. Atheists point to evil and claim that they've found a gap in what can be explained by the theist. And, as you know, they fill this gap with atheism.
The above wording is an attempt to invent an "atheism of the gaps" corresponding to the "God of the gaps" fallacy.
However, its a bit of a strained effort. The God of the gaps fallacy refers to the attempt to explain a phenomena which isnt understood with a simple supernatural gloss (God did it; end of story).
But the problem of evil does not refer to a phenomena which isn't understood and an effort to explain how it works. It refers to a very well, even intimately, understood phenomena---extreme suffering---and why a caring omnipotent being would stand by doing nothing while it went on. It involve the effort to reconcile an inconsistency between to proposed fact....not to an effort to explain causally how a particular phenomena works.
There is not a "gap" in knowledge to be filled by atheism. Atheism is simply not inconsistent with the phenomena under discussion while theism is.
Once again, what position do you think you're opposing? Christian theology? According to Christian theology, why do some people die in infancy? Due to original sin.
So this is your explanation for a loving God's inaction to aid an infant in terrible pain?
The infant is tainted with original sin and that makes inaction A-OK.
If you don't like that rationale, you can attack it, but you can only do so by shifting from an internal critique, based on the allegation of inner tensions in Christian theology, to an external critique, in which you criticize original sin according to some principle of secular ethics.
Its perfectly subject to both critiques---inconsistent internally and, in terms of an external critique of the values expressed, it leads (as in your excuse for inaction in response to a suffering infant) to blatantly cruel moral principles.
No, eliminative materialism is not far removed from the problem of evil. Nothing could be more salient to the issue at hand.
I, and so far as I can tell, no other atheist posting here, is an eliminative materialist. You can attempt to paint us with that brush all you like but you will only be attacking a strawman if you do.
To do the latter, he must, among other things, show that, despite physicalism, biochemical organisms are capable of pain and suffering.
If he can't do that, then he's left with an internal critique.
I'm not a physicalism (as I said before). And, even if I were, eliminative physicalism is a minority position among atheists.
We all know pain and suffering exists because we've all experienced it. Any claim that they don't is simply too absurd to take seriously.
Why is it the theist posters are all attempting to divert the discussion from the problem of evil. It is, after all, the chosen topic of this blog. But every time we begin to discuss it someone want to divert the issue to some supposed problem they see with atheism.
You can discuss that if you like, of course, but the evasiveness is telling all the same.
You're saying that the God-of-the-Gaps argument is different from the atheism-of-the-gaps argument? If there is a difference, it's because the reasons for putting God in the equation are much better.
Let's review how the "God-of-the-Gaps" argument works. The theist says, "You've got a naturalistic account of the universe. But there's something your worldview can't account for, namely, a universe, fine-tuning, biological complexity, etc. Theism accounts for these things, so theism is a better explanation."
The "Atheism-of-the-Gaps" argument proceeds similarly. The atheist says, "You've got a theistic account of the universe. But there's something your worldview can't account for, namely, suffering. Atheism accounts for this, so atheism is a better explanation."
You said that biological complexity can be explained by evolution. The problems are (1) that the more we learn about biology, the more mind-numbing the odds become, and (2) evolution only works when you already have extremely complex organisms. In other words, evolution can't even get started until you have self-replicating life, and anything that fits this description is going to be exceedingly complex. Here you have to appeal to chance as your explanation.
You would also have to appeal to chance to account for fine-tuning, though the odds are overwhelmingly opposed to you here as well. My question for you would be, "When does chance cease to be a good explanation? Based on what I see from the atheist camp, the answer is "Never." No matter how complex life is, no matter how finely-tuned the universe is, the atheist is happy to say, "Chance can do it." But if chance can do all that, you might want to start praying to chance. After all, chance seems omnipotent in your worldview.
Again, you are doing everything you can to divert the discussion from the supposed topic of this blog.
If you want to start a blog on PROBLEMS WITH ATHEISM, feel free to and I'll be glad to discuss those topics there. But I feel that you are just sidestepping the topic of the problem of evil since it presents so many problems for theism so I'm not going to take the bait.
Mr. Ellis,
I think you can hardly accuse me of trying to duck the problem of evil, since I just started a blog on this very topic. And I tried to bring the discussion back to the problem of evil by doing a post on Elie Wiesel.
But you still wanted to discuss whether atheists are being inconsistent in their methodology. Like it or not, this is relevant to the problem of evil. If atheists are making an argument against theism, and they're being inconsistent in their methodology (as evidenced by their treatment of other arguments), then it's relevant to point out the inconsistency.
It's also relevant to discuss other issues because the conclusion of the argument from evil is not, "Well, theists have something to think about." Rather, the conclusion is "God does not exist." Hence, in pointing out difficulties with the argument from evil, it is quite relevant to say, "But the argument can't do what you're saying, because it's only one piece of evidence, and we're trying to account for everything, not for one fact."
To put it differently, if I argued, on a different blog dedicated to intelligent design, that design points to a designer, it wouldn't be quite relevant to bring up the problem of evil. But if I argued that design proves the existence of God, you would be quite justified in saying "What about evil?" because this bears on my conclusion. Likewise, if atheists are saying that they have an argument that proves the non-existence of God, theists are justified in pointing to other evidence.
The point isn't to dodge suffering. Instead, we're trying to point out limitations in the argument. At best, the argument from evil would be some evidence against God's existence. It can never, all by itself, disprove God's existence. Many atheists don't understand this, so I'm inclined to point it out. (And, as you will see in the future, I'll point it out dozens of times, and many atheists still won't get it.)
Personally, I don't claim the problem of evil disproves God (it played practically no part in my own deconversion--I was more concerned with the simple lack of plausible evidence for theism or supernaturalism). Only that it makes the existence of God, as typically defined in western religion, implausible in the extreme.
And now, to get back to the topic of the problem of evil:
Suppose we knew beyond a reasonable doubt that the universe were created by an intelligence (a big if). What reason would we have to think that being benevolent?
Well, the fact that the universe is fine-tuned for our existence would be at least some evidence that this being is concerned about us.
In my first post, I mentioned several "extras" that are not necessary for our existence, but which we find in our world. Extras are a gift.
Above all, I would appeal to the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. We know, historically, that Jesus was known as a miracle worker. We know that he died. And we know that his followers were convinced that he had risen from the dead. We know some other things as well. When we put the evidence together, we find that the only explanation that fits all the evidence is that Jesus rose from the dead. This lends quite a bit of credibility to the Christian message, which includes the idea that God loved us so much that he died for us.
I doubt you want to discuss the resurrection. But keep in mind, the argument from evil is directed at theistic belief. So we can at least say that Christians have a reason for believing that God is benevolent, whether or not atheists agree with the reason.
david b. ellis said...
“So this is your explanation for a loving God's inaction to aid an infant in terrible pain? The infant is tainted with original sin and that makes inaction A-OK.”
You have a problem keeping track of your own argument. If you are presenting an *internal* critique of Christian theism according to the argument from evil, then you have to define the key terms in light of Christian *theology*.
This really shouldn’t be hard to grasp. What Christian theologians have you read? What Bible commentators have you read?
“Its perfectly subject to both critiques---inconsistent internally and, in terms of an external critique of the values expressed, it leads (as in your excuse for inaction in response to a suffering infant) to blatantly cruel moral principles.”
Internally inconsistent according to what yardstick? According to Biblical descriptions and ascriptions?
In order to substantiate your claim that it’s “blatantly cruel,” you will need to mount several interrelated arguments:
i) You will need to mount a general argument for some version of secular ethics.
ii) You will need to mount a general argument for some version of secular anthropology consistent with the notion of cruelty to biochemical organisms.
iii) You will need to mount a specific argument regarding the cruelty of original sin.
Thus far you are using adjectives to do the work of arguments. Do you have any supporting arguments for your position? Are you capable of making a reasoned case for your belief in the argument from evil? Or will you continually resort to tendentious assertions and question-begging adjectives?
“I, and so far as I can tell, no other atheist posting here, is an eliminative materialist. You can attempt to paint us with that brush all you like but you will only be attacking a strawman if you do.”
The question at issue is not what you *do* believe, but what you *should* believe given your secular precommitments.
If you’re going to shift to an external version of the argument from evil, then you have an intellectual obligation to deal with eliminative materialism since that is a potential secular defeater to your critique.
“I'm not a physicalism (as I said before). And, even if I were, eliminative physicalism is a minority position among atheists.”
i) That’s not a cogent objection.
ii) The leading contemporary critics of Christian theism are card-carrying materialists. And that’s integral to their attack on the faith.
“We all know pain and suffering exists because we've all experienced it. Any claim that they don't is simply too absurd to take seriously.”
I agree with you that eliminative materialism is absurd. But I agree with you on my grounds rather than yours.
While it is, indeed, absurd on its own grounds, it is not absurd in relation to metaphysical naturalism. If it’s absurd, then that represents a reductio ad absurdum of metaphysical naturalism.
“Why is it the theist posters are all attempting to divert the discussion from the problem of evil. It is, after all, the chosen topic of this blog. But every time we begin to discuss it someone want to divert the issue to some supposed problem they see with atheism. You can discuss that if you like, of course, but the evasiveness is telling all the same.”
You seem to lack a certain degree of mental discipline. Try to remember that we are answering you on your own grounds.
Either you are presenting an internal version or an external version of the argument from evil.
If internal, then you need to define the key terms according to Christian theology.
If you claim to be performing an internal critique, but fail to do this, then you are being inconsistent with your own stated agenda.
If external, then you need to do two or more things:
i) Establish a secular version of moral realism;
ii) Establish that biochemical organisms like human beings or higher animals are capable of being wronged and or suffering pain.
And that’s just for starters. Beyond the preliminaries, you would that have to show that:
iii) The evils in question are gratuitous evils.
Thus far you have failed every step of the way by assuming what you need to prove.
If it’s your position that atheism is intellectually superior to Christian theism, then you need to redeem your rationalistic claims with a commensurate level of argumentation.
Are you up to the task you set for yourself? Or is your atheism a blind faith-commitment? Secular fideism.
Well, the fact that the universe is fine-tuned for our existence would be at least some evidence that this being is concerned about us.
No. Not really. He could have made a universe with life simply to see what would happen....being completely indifferent to any suffering occurring. He might even be a sadist. He might have created it with an interest only in a species of intelligent arachnoids in the Andromeda Galaxy and is completely indifferent to the other life forms which developed.
Above all, I would appeal to the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. We know, historically, that Jesus was known as a miracle worker. We know that he died. And we know that his followers were convinced that he had risen from the dead.
If such could be could be established beyond reasonable doubt then, of course, we would have good evidence God exists.....I'm not so sure the God depicted qualifies as benevolent. Schizophrenic might be a better word given the way its behavior, as described by the bible, swings between the extremes of cruelty and compassion.
Be that as it may, since we have no good evidence the Gospel story is historically accurate this hardly qualifies as evidence of a benevolent deity (even ignoring the more sadistic aspects of the christianity and the bible).
Anyway, Steve has given his answer to the problem of the infant slowly and agonizingly dying of a congenital defect (since its tainted with original sin, God is, apparently, willing to stand by and watch it suffer).
What's your answer? Hopefully you can come up with something less blatantly cruel.
You have a problem keeping track of your own argument. If you are presenting an *internal* critique of Christian theism according to the argument from evil, then you have to define the key terms in light of Christian *theology*.
It is your position that it is not inconsistent for the entity you call God to be described as loving and benevolent and yet to do nothing for an infant suffering excruciating pain over the course of days or weeks. You claim that this is so because of original sin.
Please present an argument for this position, if you don't mind.
I think the resurrection can be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. (It's a large part of the reason I converted from atheism to Christianity.) Of course, I don't mean "beyond all doubts and wild speculations an atheist can dream up." I've seen the lengths atheists are willing to go to in their attempts to "explain" the data. I used to go to some amazing lengths myself.
No good reason for believing the Gospel accounts? Well, they're early. That's one. There are multiple sources (Mark, Q, M, L, John, and Paul). That's two. Certain portions are extremely early (the 1 Corinthians creed dates to within a few years of Jesus' death). That's three.
What exactly would you be looking for if you went in search of good sources? It seems to me that what atheists are really saying is something like this: "I don't want to accept the Gospels as records, and nothing you can say will change my mind, because I can always doubt everything." If that's your position, evidence doesn't really matter. But this is quite different from saying that there's no reason to accept the Gospels.
As for suffering children, this isn't something I would want to sum up in a few sentences at the end of some comments. If you like, I'll do a post sometime in the next week or two giving this issue a serious treatment.
I think the resurrection can be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. (It's a large part of the reason I converted from atheism to Christianity.)
I disagree but I'm not going to go into it here. I visited this blog to discuss the problem of evil rather than the claim that Jesus rose from the dead.
If you like, I'll do a post sometime in the next week or two giving this issue a serious treatment.
That works for me. I look forward to reading it.
david b. ellis said...
“Anyway, Steve has given his answer to the problem of the infant slowly and agonizingly dying of a congenital defect (since its tainted with original sin, God is, apparently, willing to stand by and watch it suffer). What's your answer? Hopefully you can come up with something less blatantly cruel.”
i) Once again, Ellis is unable to stick to his own point. He was the one who, along with Loftus, and a number of others, chose to frame the argument from evil as an internal critique of Christian theism.
I am simply answering him according to the terms in which he himself chose to cast the issue. When, however, I answer within his chosen framework, I repeatedly encounter this unresponsive response.
So I guess the question we need to ask at this juncture is if Ellis was being sincere or disingenuous in the way he framed the issue?
Does he believe his own argument or not? If he doesn’t believe his own argument, why should anyone else?
By reiterating the charge of “blatant cruelty,” he has apparently reverted to an external version of the argument. If so, then how does he propose justify his external standard or morality?
The argument from evil is a philosophical argument. It will not do level intellectual objections to the Christian faith, only to resort to anti-intellectual question-begging as soon as someone takes you up on your challenge.
By shifting from an internal to an external argument, he is thereby shifting the burden of proof. The onus is back on him to justify his moral discourse. This is not something which is logically entailed by metaphysical naturalism, even if metaphysical naturalism were true. It isn’t even clear that this is at all consistent with metaphysical naturalism. So he needs to come up with an argument for his own position instead of ducking the burden of proof which he himself has implicitly assumed by switching over to an external version of the argument from evil.
ii) You also caricature the opposing position by saying that, on this view, God is willing to “stand by and watch it suffer,” as if God is indifferent to human suffering. Once again, that hardly constitutes an internal critique of Christian theism.
There is, in Scripture, an overarching rationale for the fall (e.g. Rom 11:32; Gal 3:22).
Has Ellis ever read the Bible? What Christian theologians or Bible commentators has he read, if any?
It should be needless to point out that you can’t very well perform an internal critique of Christian theism in ignorance of Ch